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Abstract

The years between 1865 and 1877, which form the period in American history known as Reconstruction,
compose a sort of coda to the traumatic opera of the American Civil War of 1861–65. Reconstruction
embraces the twelve years of active effort to rebuild the American Union, though in some sense (because
Reconstruction had no official starting or ending date) aspects of it spluttered on well into the 1890s. I use the
word spluttered deliberately, because Reconstruction is also the ugly duckling of American history in the eyes
of many American historians, and something the public considers vaguely awful if it thinks of it at all. Absent
from Reconstruction are the conflict and the personalities that make the Civil War so colorful; it also lacks the
climactic battles and dissipates into a confusing and wearisome tale of lost opportunities, squalid victories,
and embarrassing defeats. It was, proclaimed one veteran of the Army of Northern Virginia, “not peace
established in power, but captured in shame; not throned on high by willing witnesses, but pinned to the earth
by imperial steel—the peace of the bayonet.” In many cases, especially for those who regard Reconstruction as
an unrelieved misery, almost the worst thing that can be said about someone is that they were prominent in
Reconstruction.
Keywords

reconstruction, civil war history, united states history
Disciplines

History | United States History
Creative Commons License

Creative
Commons
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
License
License.

This article is available at The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cwfac/118

Reconstruction as
a Pure Bourgeois Revolution
ALLEN C. GUELZO
The years between 1865 and 1877, which form the period in American history known as Reconstruction, compose a sort of coda to the
traumatic opera of the American Civil War of 1861–65. Reconstruction
embraces the twelve years of active effort to rebuild the American
Union, though in some sense (because Reconstruction had no official
starting or ending date) aspects of it spluttered on well into the 1890s.
I use the word spluttered deliberately, because Reconstruction is also
the ugly duckling of American history in the eyes of many American
historians, and something the public considers vaguely awful if it
thinks of it at all. Absent from Reconstruction are the conflict and
the personalities that make the Civil War so colorful; it also lacks the
climactic battles and dissipates into a confusing and wearisome tale of
lost opportunities, squalid victories, and embarrassing defeats. It was,
proclaimed one veteran of the Army of Northern Virginia, “not peace
established in power, but captured in shame; not throned on high by
willing witnesses, but pinned to the earth by imperial steel—the peace
of the bayonet.”1 In many cases, especially for those who regard Reconstruction as an unrelieved misery, almost the worst thing that can be
said about someone is that they were prominent in Reconstruction.
One reason why Reconstruction has proven difficult to evaluate is
that no convenient measuring stick for the success or failure of postwar
reconstructions existed then or now. It may be helpful, as a cure for
that vagueness, to describe three general standards conventionally
used to describe and evaluate Reconstruction. One such device is what
we may call Lincolnian Reconstruction. Abraham Lincoln was never at
ease in using the word reconstruction—he qualified it with add-ons
like “what is called reconstruction” or “a plan of reconstruction (as
the phrase goes)”—and preferred to speak of the “re-inauguration
1. “Address of Private Leigh Robinson” (November 1, 1877), in Army of Northern
Virginia Memorial Volume, edited by J. W. Jones (Richmond: J. W. Randolph and English,
1880), 180, 188.
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of the national authority” or the need to “re-inaugurate loyal state
governments.”2 The moment the war ended and his “war powers”
expired, Lincoln’s logic dictated that the rebel states should simply
resume their old place and old functions in the Union without let or
hindrance, only requiring the abandonment of slavery.
And if that really was the only goal of Reconstruction, then we
should have to say that even in Lincoln’s absence, it was a clear-cut
success. The secessionist regimes in the Southern states were finally
deposed, new federally supervised Unionist regimes were put in their
place, and one-by-one the rebel states were restored to the Union—
which is to say, they sent representatives and senators to Congress,
and acknowledged federal laws passed by Congress and the federal
military and civilian institutions that implemented them. Take it a
point further: if the Civil War’s purpose was to reestablish a federal
Union—a genuinely federal Union in which neither the states nor the
federal government claimed exclusive sovereignty but shared it in a
federal system—then Reconstruction should be as much a source of
national self-admiration as the Civil War long has been. In fact, the
next half-century proved to be something of a golden age of constitutional state rights, with states taking up the political initiative in terms
of civic reform, women’s rights, and public education long before the
federal government ever noticed them.3
But that, of course, is not the way Reconstruction has been taught
to most of us—that is, when it has been taught at all. For decades,
both the hell-no partisans of the Lost Cause and turn-of-the-century
Southern Progressives maintained that Reconstruction, once Lincoln
was removed, became a nightmare inflicted on them by a psychotically vengeful coterie of Radical Republican demagogues in Congress
led by Thaddeus Stevens, Charles Sumner, and Ben Wade. This we
may call Radical Reconstruction, and it depicts the era as a kind of
Vichy occupation, partly a draconian direct rule by scheming and
unscrupulous conquerors, and partly an unstable domination by
Southern turncoats.4 At best it was (in the highly influential work of
2. “Last Public Address,” April 11, 1865, Roy P. Basler et al., eds., The Collected Works
of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 8:400,
405.
3. Louis P. Masur, Lincoln’s Last Speech: Wartime Reconstruction and the Crisis of Reunion
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 7, 69–70; Mark Wahlgren Summers, The
Ordeal of the Reunion: A New History of Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2014), 4, 396–97.
4. Hans L. Trefousse, The Radical Republicans: Lincoln’s Vanguard for Racial Justice
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), 21.
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the then-reigning prince of Reconstruction historians, William A. Dunning, and his Columbia University graduate students J. G. Hamilton,
Walter L. Fleming, and Francis Simkins) a gigantic example of radical
hubris. At its worst it was described by Woodrow Wilson, who had
grown up in the South during Reconstruction, as a carnival of racial
misrule:
The first practical result of reconstruction under the acts of 1867
was the disfranchisement, for several weary years, of the better
whites, and the consequent giving over of the southern governments into the hands of the negroes. . . . They were but children
still; and unscrupulous men, carpetbaggers, men not come to be
citizens, but come upon an expedition of profit . . . came out of
the North to use the negroes as tools for their own selfish ends;
and succeeded, to the utmost fulfillment of their dreams. Negro
majorities for a little while filled the southern legislatures; . . .
the states were misgoverned and looted in their name; and a few
men, not of their number, not really of their interest, went away
with the gains. They were left to carry the discredit and reap
the consequences of ruin, when at last the whites who were real
citizens got control again.5
Judged by the Dunning standard, Reconstruction was temporarily
successful but for all the wrong reasons; and when it was overthrown
in 1877, it was to be judged a failure we could all remember as a road
never again to be taken in American life.
Criticism of the Dunning school—and with it, the dominance of
Southern voices in the interpretation of Reconstruction—offered its
first major challenge in the 1930s, beginning with the attacks launched
at the Dunningites by William Edward Burghardt Du Bois in Black
Reconstruction (1935) and James S. Allen (the nom de plume of Sol
Auerbach) in Reconstruction: The Battle for Democracy (1937). This, in
a broad sense, we may call Revisionist Reconstruction. The Dunning
school, Du Bois protested, had succeeded in making every “child in the
street” believe that “the history of the United States from 1866 to 1876
is something of which the nation ought to be ashamed.” Reconstruction might not have been a proud achievement but, Du Bois objected,
5. William A. Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics
(New York: Macmillan, 1910), 384–85; Bernard A. Weisberger, “The Dark and Bloody
Ground of Reconstruction Historiography,” Journal of Southern History 25 (November
1959), 428, 446; Woodrow Wilson, “The Reconstruction of the Southern States,” Atlantic
Monthly 87 (January 1901), 11.
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Reconstruction actually set an example “to democratic government
and the labor movement today.” Allen agreed: “The destruction of
the slave power was the basis for real national unity and the further
development of capitalism, which would produce conditions most
favorable for the growth of the labor movement.” The Dunningites
thought that Radical Reconstruction was something to be deplored,
and cheered when it failed; the revisionists agreed that it failed, but
wept. Southern blacks (in Du Bois’s phrase) “went free; stood a brief
moment in the sun; then moved back into slavery.”6
Unhappily, neither Du Bois nor Allen possessed a broad platform
on which to rally a countermovement; and they certainly had no academic platform in the universities. It would not be until the 1960s, after
the emergence of the civil rights movement as a “second Reconstruction,” that the idols of the Dunning school really began to fall. John
Hope Franklin’s Reconstruction after the Civil War (1961) and Kenneth
Stampp’s The Era of Reconstruction, 1865–77 (1965) started the tipping
over, to be followed by John and LaWanda Cox, Richard Current, Allen
W. Trelease, and finally Eric Foner, with his massive Reconstruction:
America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877 (1988).7
* * *
Noble as their intentions were, the revisionists had their foibles, too.
Both Du Bois and Allen were writing from self-consciously Marxist
frameworks that forbade any other understanding of Reconstruction
but through class and revolution, with race sometimes deployed as
a surrogate for class. Reconstruction thus became the moment when
working-class black and white citizens together had an opportunity
to create a new economic and political order in the South, only to
have it yanked away by a nervous white Northern bourgeoisie who
preferred making peace with the defeated Confederates to licensing
a genuinely radical, biracial workers’ movement.

6. W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America, edited by David Levering Lewis
(1935; New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 717; James S. Allen, Reconstruction: The
Battle for Democracy, 1865–1876 (New York, 1937), 28.
7. Howard K. Beale, “On Rewriting Reconstruction History,” American Historical Review 45 (July 1940), 824; Richard O. Curry, “The Civil War and Reconstruction,
1861–1877: A Critical Overview of Recent Trends and Interpretations,” Civil War History 20 (September 1974), 215–38; Michael Perman, “Accepting Defeat: Historians and
Reconstruction,” and Herman Belz, “The New Orthodoxy in Reconstruction Historiography,” in Reviews in American History 1 (March 1973), 106–13, and 14 (March 1986),
83–90, respectively.
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It was, in other words, a bourgeois-democratic revolution, not
unlike the uprisings of 1789 and 1848 in that it pitted a capitalist
middle-class bourgeoisie against a slaveholding aristocracy, striking
up alliances with peasants on the land and workers in the tenements
to overthrow the rule of the planter elite. Alas, bourgeois revolutions frighten their own architects, who are themselves the owners
of property—in this case, industrial property—and who quickly come
to see that in empowering peasants and workers, they have created
a Frankenstein monster that has no more respect for the bourgeoisie
than it had for the aristocrats.8 At that moment of self-realization, the
bourgeoisie strain to stuff the revolutionary genie they have summoned—the peasants and urban proletariat—back into the lamp from
which they had conjured it. “The bourgeoisie,” wrote Vladimir Lenin,
“strives to put an end to the bourgeois revolution halfway from its
destination, when freedom has been only half won, by a deal with the
old authorities and the landlords.” They strive “to reach a tacit pact
with the old landed aristocracy in order to preserve their power.”9
But the genie cannot be stuffed back; it is only stunned, and in time
it will reawaken with renewed strength as the guide and leader of the
socialist revolution and finish off industrial capitalism the way the
bourgeoisie finished off the aristocrats. Du Bois in particular bears the
impress of this notion of Reconstruction as a “bourgeois revolution,”
8. On the general concept of bourgeois revolutions, see Colin Jones, “Bourgeois
Revolution Revivified: 1789 and Social Change,” in Colin Lucas, ed., Rewriting the French
Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 69–118; David Lockwood, “War, the State,
and the Bourgeois Revolution,” War and Society 25 (October 2006), 53–78; and Shirley
Gruner, “The Revolution of July 1830 and the Expression ‘Bourgeoisie,’” Historical Journal 11 (1968), 462–71. For arguments over which specific events can qualify as bourgeois
revolutions, see Lawrence Stone, “The Bourgeois Revolution of Seventeenth-Century
England Revisited,” Past and Present 109 (November 1985), 44–46 (on why the English
Civil Wars do not); Stephen C. Topik, “Brazil’s Bourgeois Revolution?” Americas 48
(October 1991), 270 (on why the overthrow of the Brazilian monarchy in 1889 does not);
Jesús Cruz, “Notability and Revolution: Social Origins of the Political Elite in Liberal
Spain, 1800 to 1853,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 36 (January 1994), 99 (on
why nineteenth-century Spain’s liberals did not constitute a bourgeois revolution); and
Tom Lewis, “Structures and Agents: The Concept of ‘Bourgeois Revolution’ in Spain,”
Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies 3 (1999), 10 (on why nineteenth-century
Spain’s liberals did constitute a bourgeois revolution).
9. “Eric Foner’s ‘Reconstruction’ at Twenty-Five,” Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 14 (January 2015), 21; Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (London: Allen Lane,
1967), 112, 143; Vladimir Lenin, “The Agrarian Question and the Forces of the Revolution” (1907), in Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), 12:335; Jesús Cruz,
“An Ambivalent Revolution: The Public and the Private in the Construction of Liberal
Spain,” Journal of Social History 30 (Autumn 1996), 6.
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for in Du Bois’s telling, Reconstruction’s “vision of democracy across
racial lines” was undone by a “counterrevolution of property.”10
Critics of Marxist historiography have frequently rushed into the
breaches opened by the English Civil Wars, the French Revolution, and
of course the American Civil War with wholesale denials that these
events were in any sense revolutionary, and indeed, many Marxist
historians over time have glumly yielded to these protestations. And
the American Civil War certainly offers good reasons for hesitating
to cover the war and Reconstruction with a revolutionary draping.
The first is that the Civil War was not revolutionary if discontinuity
must be the fundamental evidence of revolution. Discontinuity was
exactly what the Civil War had been waged to prevent. Moreover, the
American bourgeoisie—which includes Lincoln, the Radical Republicans, and the rank and file of the Northern soldiery—did not actually
represent much of what could be safely called industrial capitalism.
The contest waged between 1861 and 1865 was between two versions
of agrarianism, between the free-labor family farm and the slave-
labor cotton plantation. According to the 1860 census, in the South 65
percent of its congressional districts were characterized economically
by plantation agriculture, and in the North, 72 percent were predominantly rural, with only forty districts qualifying as industrial. Only in
Rhode Island did workers in American factories amount to more than
20 percent of the population (although Massachusetts was a close second, at 19 percent); in the West, the numbers rarely topped 1 percent.
Even then, fully half of American manufacturing in the 1860s was
still powered by water rather than steam, and the number of workers
one could expect to meet in a mill or factory hovered between eight
and fourteen. Despite Jacob Riis’s sensational depiction of industrial
workers living in near labor-camp conditions, the plat of working-class
housing in the post-1865 decades was the one-story and two-story
cottage. Multifamily housing comprised only half the housing stock
in Boston and Chicago; only 1 percent of the housing in Philadelphia
accommodated six or more families. Not until the twentieth century
would the United States begin to emerge as a genuinely industrial
10. Armistead L. Robinson, “Beyond the Realm of Social Consensus: New Meanings
of Reconstruction for American History,” Journal of American History 68 (September
1981), 279; Andrew Zimmerman, “Marxism, the Popular Front, and the American Civil
War,” in The World the Civil War Made, edited by Gregory P. Downs and Kate Masur
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 308; Friedrich Engels to Karl
Marx, November 15, 1862, in Robin Blackburn, An Unfinished Revolution: Karl Marx and
Abraham Lincoln (New York: Verso, 2011), 201; Neil Davidson, “The American Civil
War Considered as a Bourgeois Revolution,” Historical Materialism 19 (December 2011),
45–91; Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, 580.
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power and, with it, an economy clearly demarcated by class and class
conflict. Even then, most Americans lived in towns of twenty-five
hundred or less well into the twentieth century.11
But a second and greater problem lies in the actual history of Reconstruction as a conventional bourgeois revolution, because there is no
evidence that the victorious Republicans who essayed to build a bourgeois South in the ruins of the old plantation order ever panicked at
the prospect of empowering blacks or poor whites, or betrayed them
by establishing a self-protecting alliance with the quondam aristocrats.
Nor did the freedpeople experience Marxist alienation; they endured
bourgeois frustration at their exclusion from property ownership and
political power, and that was how they articulated it. So we must say
that Reconstruction was indeed a bourgeois revolution, but it was a
pure one—a self-contained revolutionary event outside both Marxist and counter-Marxist theory. It failed not because it sold out but
because it was crushed by the resurgent political power of a bloodied
but unbowed aristocracy.12
* * *
Reconstruction, when it has been the object of serious attention, has
long been seen as a political event, a racial crisis moment, or a bizarre
social and economic entr’acte between the Civil War and the Gilded
Age. But it has only rarely been spoken of in ideological or intellectual
terms; not even Foner’s massive Reconstruction gives the intellectual
history of Reconstruction more than passing notice.13 But Reconstruction was the test of an ideology in ways that would overshadow all
these other methodologies if we were not so inclined to embarrassment
over the nature of that ideology. The great Republican goal of abolishing slavery was not seen by Republicans, as we are tempted to see
11. James Huston, The British Gentry, the Southern Planter, and the Northern Family
Farmer: Agriculture and Sectional Antagonism in North America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 2015), 75, 22–31, and Calculating the Value of the Union: Slavery,
Property Rights, and the Economic Origins of the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2003), 75–76; David Montgomery, Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical
Republicans, 1862–1872 (New York: Knopf, 1967), 4–5, 8; Robert J. Gordon, The Rise and
Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2016), 97, 102–5.
12. Neil Davidson, “The American Civil War Considered as a Bourgeois Revolution,”
and John Ashworth, “Towards a Bourgeois Revolution? Explaining the American Civil
War,” Historical Materialism 19 (January 2011), 45–91, 195–203.
13. Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877 (New York:
Harper & Row, 1988), 156. This stands in contrast to his virtuoso treatment of the
ideology of prewar Republicanism, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the
Republican Party before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).
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it, as a crusade to right a racial injustice; abolishing slavery was not,
to them, much of a racial question at all but rather an economic one.
“I see National glory in the future such as the past has never seen,”
rejoiced Benjamin Brown French, and not just because slavery “forever
abolished” a racial caste system, but because the South would soon
be “thriving under Free labor & Free rule! No more Cotton lords, but
plenty of Cotton Commons, and all the land pouring out its productions
& becoming immensely rich!” The Union “represents the principles of
free labor,” declared William Cullen Bryant, and only when “the victory
of the Northern society of free labor over the landed monopoly of the
Southern aristocracy” was complete would the war be over.
The United States is truly the land—the very paradise of labor. . . .
Even capital, which in Europe controls labor, here becomes subordinate to and serves labor. It is the free and intelligent labor of the
country that creates the Administration or the Government. . . .
Whatever may be said against the doings and intrigues of the
politicians, yet it is the highest honor of the system of government
of the United States that Free labor—that is to say, the equal right
of all men to the pursuit of happiness—has been recognized as
the first natural and inalienable right.14
It took a long time for the importance of the free-labor ideology
to work its way back to the front of Civil War historiography, and in
truth it still enjoys only the most tenuous of holds in that literature.
In the most basic sense, free labor was simply shorthand for liberal
economic democracy. It was the Enlightenment’s school of economics,
and like the Enlightenment, it predicted that “democratic, bourgeois
freedom and the supremacy of economics would one day lead to
the salvation of all mankind.” Free labor found its ablest expositors
in the “Manchester School” in Great Britain; Alexis de Tocqueville,
François Guizot, and Edouard Laboulaye in France; Johan Jacoby
and John Prince Smith in the German states; and the Whig party
in the United States. Among free labor’s fundamental tenets were
the encouragement of small-scale manufacturing, especially through
government-sponsored “internal improvements” in the form of canals,
highways, and railroads; economic mobility, with constant movement
14. “Diary entry for July 8, 1863,” in Benjamin Brown French, Witness to the Young
Republic: A Yankee’s Journal, 1828–1870, edited by Donald B. Cole and John Joseph
McDonough (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1989), 426; The Preservation of the Union, a National Economic Necessity (New York: W. C. Bryant, 1863), 5–6;
W. W. Broom, Great and Grave Question for American Politicians, with a Topic for America’s
Statesmen (New York: C. S. Westcott, 1865), 65.
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up the ladder of classes; and the practice of a constellation of bourgeois virtues—thrift, prudence, industry, religious faith, temperance,
rationality, nationalism—that together would dignify “the enterprising mechanic, who raises himself by his ingenious labors from the
dust and turmoil of his workshop, to an abode of ease and elegance”
and “the industrious tradesman, whose patient frugality enables him
at last to accumulate enough to forego the duties of the counter and
indulge a well-earned leisure.”15
In the eyes of the free-labor bourgeoisie, the mistake of the South
had been to allow the thousand-bale planters to turn the Enlightenment clock backward to medieval serfdom, in much the same way the
Congress of Vienna had turned back the political clock to the ancien
régime. “Who knows,” asked the New-York Tribune, “but we may see
revived [in the South] the feudal tenures—maiden-right, wardship,
baronial robberies, the seizure of white children for the market, military service, and the horrible hardships of villenage which men have
fondly deemed forever abolished” as the logical corollaries of slavery.
In the South, the ruling class of “monarchists and aristocrats” had
shunned government-sponsored improvements, cultivated a cultural
style based on braggadocio, and held poor white citizens and black
slaves in the grip of a permanent and oppressive hierarchy. “There
labor has been degraded, the laborer left untaught . . . thus converting half the Union into a charnel house of despotism, without a free
religion, free speech, free press or free schools.”16
The Civil War, however, had swept this “despotism” away, and
then cleared the path for the introduction into the South of a New
England–style “high type” of culture: “the cultivated valley, the peaceful village, the church, the school-house, and thronging cities.” James
15. György Lukács, “The Changing Function of Historical Materialism,” in History
and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, translated by Rodney Livingstone
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), 225; Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, 11–39;
Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1979), 152–78; Michael S. Green, Freedom, Union, and Power: Lincoln and
His Party during the Civil War (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 30–57; “The
Labor Crisis,” North American Review 105 (July 1867), 178, 181, 183, 185, 197; Gruner,
“The Revolution of July 1830 and the Expression ‘Bourgeoisie,’” 462.
16. “The Slave-Holding Utopia,” New-York Daily Tribune, October 6, 1862; “Our
Country’s Future,” Chicago Tribune, September 28, 1864; Proofs for Workingman of the
Monarchic and Aristocratic Designs of the Southern Conspirators and their Northern Allies
(n.p., 1864), 1; Peter Kolchin, American Slavery, 1619–1877 (New York: Hill and Wang,
1993), 179; Heather Cox Richardson, The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor, and Politics
in the Post-Civil War North, 1865–1901 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2001), 6–8, 22–26.
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Lawrence Orr, South Carolina’s first Reconstruction governor, sighed
to Northern journalist Sidney Andrews that he was “tired of South
Carolina as she was. . . . I covet for her the material prosperity of New
England. I would have her acres teem with life and vigor and industry
and intelligence, as do those of Massachusetts.” The South “under the
old system” was “adverse to manufacturing and commercial enterprises,” but now, Harper’s New Monthly Magazine predicted, the “tide
of free labor” that would rush into the conquered Confederacy “will
be incalculable.” They meant that literally: “the only certain road to
Union-izing the South is, to plant in it colonies of Northern men” to
displace the plantation owners. Then, at last, “under the mighty spur
of equal competition that so quickens every impulse and faculty, and
brings all the energies into play,” the South’s “worn-out plantations
will become thriving farms, its mines and inexhaustible water-powers
will call into play the incessant demand and supply of vigorous industry and active capital.17
Frederick Douglass envisioned a “reconstruction such as will protect
loyal men, black and white, in their persons,” but one which will also
“cause Northern industry, Northern capital, and Northern civilization
to flow into the South, and make a man from New England as much
at home in Carolina as elsewhere in the Republic.” In John Greenleaf
Whittier’s vision, Reconstruction would
The cruel lie of caste refute,
Old forms remould, and substitute
For Slavery’s lash the freeman’s will,
For blind routine, wise-handed skill;
A school-house plant on every hill,
Stretching in radiate nerve-lines thence
The quick wires of intelligence;
Till North and South together brought
Shall own the same electric thought,
In peace a common flag salute,
And, side by side in labor’s free
And unresentful rivalry,
Harvest the fields wherein they fought.
17. “The Work to Be Done at the South,” American Freedman 1 (December 1866), 136;
Sidney Andrews, The South since the War: As Shown by Fourteen Weeks of Travel and Observation in Georgia and the Carolinas (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1866), 96; “Desperation
and Colonization,” Continental Monthly 1 (June 1862), 664–65; Samuel Osgood, “New
Aspects of the American Mind,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 34 (May 1867), 795; “The
Southern Industrial Prospect,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 52 (March 1876), 590.
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The success of Reconstruction, argued Carl Schurz, could be measured accurately only when the South “shall have thus fulfilled social
and political organization all those conditions which form the basis
of free-labor society.”18
Albert T. Morgan, who had been a student at Oberlin College at the
war’s beginning and served in the 2nd Wisconsin at Gettysburg, had a
vision of Reconstruction as “a tide of thrifty emigrants and others with
capital settling southward” and “within twenty-five years” making
“the two million people of the Mississippi lowlands twenty millions,
and in a century a hundred millions.” Charles Woodward Stearns, who
had followed John Brown to Kansas, resolved “during the war . . . that
if it resulted in the abolition of Slavery,” he would “go South, and do
what we could, for the perfect development of the colored race. . . .
First, their education and moral improvement; secondly, their right
to vote; and thirdly, the making them the owners of the land they
cultivate.” Reconstruction offered a means of refashioning the entire
labor system of the South, provided, wrote Albion Tourgée, that the
South was “desouthernized and thoroughly nationalized.”19
Tourgée was an example of how eager Northerners were to help
this process along. Born in Ohio and educated in New York, Tourgée
had served in the 105th Ohio, endured the sufferings of Libby Prison
as a prisoner of war, and settled in Greensboro, North Carolina, at the
end of the war to find relief in a warmer climate for a wound that had
damaged his spine. He opened a law office and became president of a
small wood-handle business, the Snow Turning Company, whose success left him “perfectly thunderstruck at the profits” as well as the good
18. Frederick Douglass, “Reconstruction,” Atlantic Monthly 18 (December 1866), 764;
John Greenleaf Whittier, “Snow-Bound,” in American Poetry: The Nineteenth Century,
volume 1: Freneau to Whitman (New York: Library of America, 1993), 488–89; Schurz,
“The True Problem,” Atlantic Monthly 19 (March 1867), 372–73; Mitchell Snay, “Freedom
and Progress: The Dilemma of Southern Republican Thought during Radical Reconstruction,” American Nineteenth Century History 5 (Spring 2004), 100–104.
19. Charles Woodward Stearns, The Black Man of the South and the Rebels; or, The
Characteristics of the Former, and the Recent Outrages of the Latter (New York: American
News, 1872), 27–28; Albert T. Morgan, Yazoo; or, On the Picket Line of Freedom in the
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wages paid to its largely black workforce. John Hay, who had been
Lincoln’s private secretary, was another example. He had been sent in
1864 to register Southerners willing to take the oath of allegiance, and
came away sufficiently intrigued by Florida (“It is the only thing that
smells of the Original Eden on the Continent”) that he bought land
to grow oranges near St. Augustine. Even Harriet Beecher Stowe, the
author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, bought orange groves near Jacksonville,
moved South, and created a free-labor colony around the village of
Mandarin. “People came hither from the North,” wrote a New Orleans
contributor to DeBow’s Review, “with the idea that they were coming
to an El Dorado, where fortunes were to be gained in a day.”20
Here was a bourgeois revolution—not, in the Marxist sense, a
necessary footstool to the “real” proletarian revolution or the self-
interested embrace of Southern grandees by terrified Northern bourgeoisie to keep black people and white working people at bay, but a
pure bourgeois revolution, as an end in itself, as the triumph of liberal
democracy, an Enlightenment counterrevolution against what the
Northern middle classes feared might be the real wave of the future,
the Romantic renascence of oligarchy and monarchy.
* * *
The principal obstacle to realizing this dream was the refusal of the
defeated Southern planter class to admit that it had been defeated,
for that class had by no means been swept away by the war. “They
are beaten, they are cowed,” warned Union quartermaster general
Montgomery Meigs, but “they have been treated with trust[in]g condescension instead of the severity that justice & policy both demanded
& they will revenge themselves for their defeat upon the North &
upon every black in every mode which may be safe.” Slavery might
be gone, but “the masters, whose pride and honor are staked upon
the claim that free labor must fail, combine to make it fail.”21 They,
20. Mark Elliott, Color-Blind Justice: Albion Tourgée and the Quest for Racial Equality from
the Civil War to Plessy v. Ferguson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 146; John
Taliaferro, All the Great Prizes: The Life of John Hay, from Lincoln to Roosevelt (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2014), 67–68; Nancy Koester, Harriet Beecher Stowe: A Spiritual Life
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2014), 263–66, 279–82; Charles A. Pilsbury,
“Farming in the South,” DeBow’s Review 5 (April 1868), 363.
21. Russell F. Weigley, Quartermaster General of the Union Army: A Biography of M. C.
Meigs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 336; W. M. Grosvenor, “The Rights
of the Nation, and the Duty of Congress,” New Englander and Yale Review 24 (October
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too, had lived by a set of presuppositions, but one based on a general suspicion of bourgeois ambitions. Slave-owning promoted “a
certain carelessness of wealth and easy profuseness in expenditure,”
complained Robert Dale Owen. “Habits of regulated industry are
seldom found within the sphere of its influence,—its tendency being
to substitute . . . indolent fashions of dependence and of luxurious
self-indulgence.” The “typical Southerner,” feared a contributor to the
Atlantic Monthly, “possessed a . . . cast of character which was founded
mainly on family, distinction, social culture, exemption from toil, and
command over the lives and fortunes of his underlings.”
Careless of his own money, he was inclined to be careless in all
pecuniary affairs, often running heavily into debt and showing
habitual negligence in settling small accounts. . . . A reputation for
gallantry and generosity became highly esteemed in the South. In
consequence, many individuals in their efforts to attain it degenerated into bravoes and spendthrifts; the character of the fire-eater
became almost as much admired as that of the gentleman. The
passing of high words and blows, canings, cowhidings, and so
on, all terminated by the drawing of knives and pistols . . . and
duels, became every-day occurrences in the South.
“As long as slave labor existed,” one South Carolinian admitted, “the
habits and predilections of the whites were unfavorable to commerce
and manufactures,” and “free labor avoided the limits of the South.”22
Not only the culture of the South but its physical circumstances as
well stood in the path of embourgeoisement. The South owned only 12
percent of the nation’s mills and factories, and employed as laborers in those establishments only 7 percent of its population. Cotton
agriculture remained after 1865, as it had been before the war, the
producer of the republic’s single most valuable export commodity
(some 32 percent of all exports as late as 1889). And no wonder: while
commodity prices for wheat, corn, and coal had operated (except for
the war years) within fairly narrow ranges, cotton was selling above
all its prewar highs; in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas,
cotton acreage and production expanded, employing a black labor
force indistinguishable from that under slavery. Great Britain still
bought 58 percent of the cotton it imported for textile manufacturing
22. Robert Dale Owen, The Wrong of Slavery, the Right of Emancipation, and the Future of
the African Race in the United States (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott, 1864), 116–17; “South
Carolina Morals,” Atlantic Monthly 39 (April 1877), 467–68, 470; Daniel Hundley, Social
Relations in Our Southern States (New York: Henry B. Price, 1860), 58; T. M. Logan, “The
Southern Industrial Prospect,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 52 (March 1876), 590.
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from the United States, and the percentage would continue to rise
through 1876.23
Struggling to jump-start a New England–ized economy, émigré
Northern bourgeois missionaries like Tourgée and Stearns borrowed
a page from the old Whig strategy book and spent unprecedented
amounts of money on what the Whig Party had once called “internal
improvements”—especially railroads and public education. Railroads
would bring markets into the cotton hinterlands, dazzling the poor
white farmer with goods, freeing the black farmer from debt and tenancy, and opening access to markets for cash crops. They will “inspire
the enterprise of the South with new vigor” and encourage “every
sensible man” to “bend himself to the task of building up the new
South instead of brooding over the glories of the lost cause.” And
education would ensure that “the child of the humblest citizen may,
without expense, be carefully instructed in all common branches.”
So Alabama and Texas doubled their railroad mileage between 1866
and 1872; Arkansas, which counted only thirty-eight miles of railroad
at the end of the war, had 258 by 1872. Elementary and secondary
schools more than doubled in Mississippi, North and South Carolina,
and Florida between 1870 and 1879; in Georgia they quadrupled.24
But the railroads were not, as it turned out, a charm. Construction costs fluctuated between $30,000 and $50,000 per mile, and new
rail lines built on speculation folded as fast as they were finished.
“The great majority of railroads,” William Grosvenor reported in
1873, “yield less than ordinary interest on the investment, and very
many . . . still barely pay running expenses and interest on bonds.”
In the Natchez district, six new railroad companies were established
in the early 1870s; all of them failed. Georgia’s state-owned railroad,
the Western and Atlantic, plunged the state into a debt of $750,000 in
two years. Similar problems dogged the effort to jump-start education.
In Southern states where no public schooling systems had existed
before the war, the construction and staffing costs were staggering.
In Mississippi alone, 432 schoolhouses were built in just the 1871–72
fiscal year; the teaching staffs alone numbered forty-eight hundred,
23. The Tribune Almanac for 1874, edited by J. F. Cleveland (New York: Tribune Association, 1874), 84; Philadelphia Public Ledger Almanac (Philadelphia: George W. Child,
1875), 11; Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life after Reconstruction (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 14–15; An American Almanac for 1878, edited by
A. R. Spofford (New York: American News Company, 1878), 278, 300; William J. Cooper,
“The Cotton Crisis in the Antebellum South: Another Look,” Agricultural History 49
(April 1975), 387–90.
24. Snay, “Freedom and Progress,” 106–7; Cleveland, The Tribune Almanac for 1873,
25.
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and the overall costs during the Mississippi system was just over a
million dollars. These investments left Southern states mired in debt,
Louisiana alone having $2.2 million in unfunded liability, tax receipts
of only $4.3 million, and a budget deficit of $60,000. South Carolina
was in even worse shape: it had $5.3 million in unfunded indebtedness and only $1.6 million in revenue.25
Despite the overall impoverishment imposed on the South by the war
and the legal abolition of slavery, the patterns of economic production
remained remarkably unchanged. In western Alabama’s “black belt,”
236 landowners possessed at least $10,000 in real estate in 1860 (with
the median landholding amounting to sixteen hundred acres); 101 of
those landowners were still in possession in 1870—which was about
the same rate of persistence over time that had prevailed before the war.
If anything, the patterns of landowning showed increases in the size of
landholdings by the top 8 percent of planters in 1870, while the middle
brackets actually showed a decline. In North Carolina’s Union County,
agricultural acreage not only increased in the post-Reconstruction years,
but so did the number of cotton plantations of over one thousand acres;
in Mississippi’s Claiborne County, the number of landholdings in the
50-to-199-acre bracket jumped from 73 to 170. And it was noticeable
that outside the principal cities, that great marker of bourgeois economics, the use of cash as a medium of exchange, entered only fitfully
into Southern calculations. The New York Cash Store in Greenville,
Alabama, advertised (despite its name) that “we will take in exchange
for goods, country produce, particularly Eggs, Chickens, Bees Wax, Dry
Hides, Peas, Corn Meal, and anything else that we can dispose of.”26
Former slaveholders, thanks in large measure to the Johnson
amnesties and the failure to break up Confederate property owning
25. Grosvenor, “The Railroads and the Farms,” Atlantic Monthly 32 (November 1873),
608; J. B. Hodgskin, “Financial Condition of the United States,” North American Review
104 (April 1869), 537; 120 Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait (Washington:
National Center for Education Statistics, 1993), 42; Justin Behrend, Reconstructing Democracy: Grassroots Black Politics in the Deep South after the Civil War (Athens: University
of Georgia Press, 2015), 125–28, 144; William Y. Thompson, “Robert Toombs and the
Georgia Railroads,” Georgia Historical Quarterly 40 (March 1956), 56–57; Stuart Grayson Noble, Forty Years of the Public Schools in Mississippi (New York: Teacher’s College,
Columbia University, 1918), 34.
26. Steven Hahn, “Class and State in Postemancipation Societies: Southern Planters
in Comparative Perspective,” American Historical Review 95 (February 1990), 86; Wayne
K. Durrill, “Producing Poverty: Local Government and Economic Development in
a New South County, 1874–1884,” Journal of American History 71 (March 1985), 778;
Michael Wayne, The Reshaping of Plantation Society: The Natchez District, 1860–80 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1983), 87; Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of
Modern America, 1877–1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 148.
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or confiscate the land, were thus free to use cotton profits to maintain
a version of the plantation system, closing off opportunities for the
freedmen to acquire land and forcing them into peonage. “Slavery is
abolished,” agreed William Grosvenor, “but peonage, or some other
form of forced labor, hardly less unjust or dangerous to the nation than
slavery itself, is the natural result of the present condition of affairs
at the South, the only solution to which the mind or inclination of
the land-owner turns.” Peonage, in turn, gave white Democrats the
power to control black voting; and control of voting would spell both
the end of Republican governments and a determination to keep free-
labor economics at arm’s length and “keep the negro in his condition
of ignorance, that they may retain him as nearly as possible in his old
state of slavery.”27 “The relation of master and slave no longer exists
here,” wrote one Mississippi valley planter, “but out of it has evolved
that of patron and retainer,” which was a far cry from “one purely
of business” or “the ordinary relation of landlord and tenant or of
employer and employee.” Given the resilience of cotton as a commodity, free labor had to be suppressed to prevent labor shortages that
would have driven the cost of production beyond control. Reconstruction Republicans might have found a way to undermine the re-creation
of planter dominance if they could have recruited small-scale white
farmers to their banner. But the taxes required to support the new
investments were based on property, and they pressed down heavily
on no one so much as the small farmer. “Here and there through all
the cotton states . . . are reappearing the planter princes of old time,
still lords of acres though not of slaves.”28 Slavery might have been
legally dead, but it was only being replaced by hutted serfdom.
27. Grosvenor, “The Rights of the Nation, and the Duty of Congress,” 756; Jonathan
Weiner, “Planter Persistence and Social Change: Alabama, 1850–1870,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 7 (Autumn 1976), 237–38, 241, 257; William N. Parker, “The South in
the National Economy, 1865–1970,” Southern Economic Journal 46 (April 1980), 1021–22,
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J. Brown (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 97; Douglas R. Egerton, The Wars
of Reconstruction: The Brief, Violent History of America’s Most Progressive Era (New York:
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“Fiscal Policy and the Failure of Radical Reconstruction in the Lower South,” in Region,
Race, and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of C. Vann Woodward, edited by J. Morgan Kousser
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Northern free-labor apostles, discouraged by the poor inroads they
had made on Southern culture, went home, disillusioned. They were
only “merchants, shopkeepers, mechanics, manufacturers, speculators, brokers, bankers” and not “barons after the fashion of the South.”
They were subject to harassment, shunning, and violence. Leander
Bigger, an Ohioan who moved to South Carolina as a Freedmen’s
Bureau agent after service in the Union army, described the burning
of a store he owned west of Manning, South Carolina, where the chief
offense seemed to have been his willingness to extend credit to black
farmers trying to set up on their own.
They ransacked the store. . . . All my dry goods—everything that
was combustible—they took out into the square, and took a keg
of powder that I kept in a concealed place . . . piled the goods
over it, and set the pile on fire. The goods, being calicoes, muslins,
and delains, burnt slowly. They carried us up to the fire, and the
speaker (they gave all their orders by signals) ordered his men
to mount. They mounted their horses, formed in line, and then
the speaker came up to me and told me, “You must quit business. This is only a warning: the next time we will put you on the
fire.” . . . He said he was from hell and represented the devil; that
he would take me with him if I did not obey orders.29
Another South Carolina “merchant” committed a similar trespass
by trying to impose the logic of the ledger by foreclosing “a lien he
had on the crop of a planter’s widow in the county.”
He did it because she was pursuing the usual aristocratic course
of evading payment and putting him off. The indignity threw the
lady into convulsions which caused her death. She was hardly
buried before her three grown sons, all under twenty-five, were
mounted and on their way to the merchant’s. They found him
in a lawyer’s office in town, put everybody out but him, and
closed the door. His screams and cries for mercy alarmed all the
village. A crowd collected, and tried to interfere. But one of the
young men came out on the steps with a cocked pistol in each
hand, and kept them off till the victim was insensible, beaten to a
jelly, gashed all over, and had one ear cut off. They then came out
and rode off. The merchant lay at the point of death for weeks,
is yet (two months since the fray) in bed, and is maimed for life.
29. “The Political Condition of South Carolina,” Atlantic Monthly 39 (February 1877),
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The affair was mentioned in no paper, and the young men have
never been indicted.
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s free-labor colony in Florida limped on
through white suspicion and unexplained arson, and Stowe’s presence gradually diminished until by 1884 she and her ailing husband
left to return no more. Charles Stearns was similarly flummoxed at
the unwillingness of black Southerners to internalize the free-labor
work ethic. “I can describe their conduct no better than by calling it
a perfect carnival of waste. . . . If hay of their own needed cutting, it
would be left standing until nearly dried up; and if we found fault
with all this dilatoriness, we would be denounced as ‘worse than the
rebels.’” Eventually, Stearns concluded that he “cannot conscientiously
advise Northern men to come South.”30
The great losers in this process were Southern blacks. In the Mississippi Valley and the vast Black Belt of Alabama, Georgia, and the
Carolinas, only 8 percent of black people owned their own land. In
South Carolina, over 75 percent of the lower Piedmont’s twenty-four
thousand tenant farmers were black, fully half of them sharecroppers
by 1900.31 “Although emancipated,” John Mercer Langston warned
in 1879, the freedman “has not been given practical independence
of the old slave-holding class, constituting the land-proprietors and
employers in the section where he lives and labors for daily support.”
And no wonder: Southern elites saw little they wanted to embrace
in the free-labor ideology, nor were there many incentives for them
to do so. “Southerners used to look on the Northerners as coarse,
money-getting people. . . . Their contempt for the commercial character
of the North originated, of course, in the aristocratic training of the
plantations, and their hatred of the liberty and equality doctrines . . .
arose from the intolerance natural to all aristocracies.” But so did
Southern yeomen, who could not disentangle white supremacy from
30. “South Carolina Morals,” 473; Charles Gayarre, “The Southern Question,” North
American Review 125 (November 1877), 475; Koester, Harriet Beecher Stowe, 281, 318;
Stowe to Charles Beecher, May 29, 1867, in Charles Edward Stowe, Life of Harriet Beecher
Stowe: Compiled from Her Letters and Journals (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1889), 402;
Stearns, The Black Man of the South, 334; Dan T. Carter, When the War Was Over: The Failure
of Self-Reconstruction in the South, 1865–1867 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1985), 163; Richard Current, Those Terrible Carpetbaggers: A Reinterpretation (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 369–70.
31. Lacy K. Ford, “Rednecks and Merchants: Economic Development and Social Tensions in the South Carolina Upcountry, 1865–1900,” Journal of American History 71 (September 1984), 305; George C. Rable, “Bourbonism, Reconstruction, and the Persistence
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economics. The same Confederate private who denounced the crimes
of Reconstruction at the beginning of this essay likewise hailed slavery
as the best charm against the evil attractions of the marketplace:
What if the future shall say, that what the world called slavery,
railed against as such, rolling up the whites of quite worldly eyes,
in horror that such a thing should exist, stands forth as a patriarchal, beneficent relation, the kindest for the slave, as he came to
us, not as France’s “rights of man” fain would have him come;
and what is now lauded to the skies, as “freedom,” be exhibited,
as a cruel, grasping sauve qui peut, and Devil take the hindmost,
the most sordid, the most heartless of all tyranny, the one which
most degradingly, and least pitifully, shoves the weakest to the
wall, and keeps him there.
Free labor could even inspire a peculiarly gendered disdain, since
(declared the Southern novelist Augusta Jane Evans in 1867) free labor
made Northerners “effeminate, selfish, most unscrupulously grasping.” Even their children were “pitiable manikins already chanting
praises to the Gold Calf.”32
Redemption was an anti-free-labor strategy as much as it was a
strategy of political exclusion. “The nigger is going to be made a serf,
sure as you live,” prophesied one white Alabamian to John Townsend
Trowbridge in 1865. “It won’t need any law for that.” And not only
blacks. When it was pointed out that South Carolina’s “eight box law”
(requiring a voter to be able to read the names of candidates and the
respective offices they were running for in order to place the correct
ballot in one of eight ballot boxes) would disfranchise poor whites
as easily as blacks, the major general of the South Carolina militia
merely replied, “We care not if it does.” The leader of the Republican
minority protested that this had no other purpose than “keeping the
middle classes and the poor whites, together with the negroes, from
having anything to do with the elections,” and he was not wrong.33
* * *
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Reconstruction aspired to be a pure bourgeois revolution, and it
expected to triumph as effortlessly as nineteenth-century liberal
notions of progress had promised. If Marx had been right, that triumph would have, in turn, yielded ineluctably to a workers’ rebellion, but it did not. So much for ineluctability; time sometimes does
indeed go backward. To have achieved a different outcome would
have required two ingredients—time and force—which circumstances
denied Reconstruction. It is not inconsistent to imagine a bourgeois
revolution arriving in the company of swords (that was certainly
the way the English Civil Wars were described for a long time), and
Wendell Phillips certainly believed that Reconstruction could hardly
last less than forty years. “We have to . . . annihilate the old South,
and put a new one there,” and the best plan Phillips could imagine
was long-term military occupation. “When England conquered the
Highlands, she held them,—held them until she could educate them;
and it took a generation. That is just what we have to do with the
South.”34 But as Gregory P. Downs, in one of the more remarkable
books on Reconstruction in the past twenty years, has complained,
few Americans were prepared to supply those swords in meaningful
numbers or over a meaningful length of time. “Out of the reduced
army of thirty thousand men,” estimated the North American Review
on the eve of Grant’s reelection in 1872, “the government could spare
only one tenth for service at the South, exclusive of ordinary garrison
duty.” The reluctance to use state force in overwhelming strength, and
to bear the political costs that accompany it, are easy to criticize from
the distance of a century and a half, but the criticisms tend to freeze
on the lips when it is realized that these were exactly the criticisms
deployed most recently against the Gulf Wars.35
In the South, the pure bourgeois revolution failed. Its white promoters were politically inexperienced, and they made gaffes from
which it proved impossible to recover. Their chief ally, the freedpeople, were a numerical minority almost everywhere in Southern politics, and their own inexperience and a lifelong suspicion bred from
oppression and betrayal made it difficult to create stable coalitions.
The freedpeople were frankly reluctant to accept white Republican
leadership as unquestioningly as whites expected. The “Gideonites”
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35. Gregory P. Downs, After Appomattox: Military Occupation and the Ends of War
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015), 250–53; “The Political Campaign
of 1872,” North American Review 115 (October 1872), 418.

70

Reconstruction as Bourgeois Revolution

who descended on the occupied Port Royal Sound to “educate and
uplift” the freedpeople discovered that “nothing is more evident to
those who actually know the Colored, than that while they respect,
value, and revere, the good, they want little companionship with the
whites.” Black Methodist leader Henry McNeal Turner frankly told
“my colored friends” that “the white men are not to be trusted. They
will betray you.”36
But just as divisive were the fault lines that separated blacks from
blacks. A racial hierarchy had long existed within the black South
that bestowed privilege along a carefully graded spectrum of color.
“There is in the Southern States a great amount of prejudice in regards
to color,” William Wells Brown admitted in 1867, “even among the
negroes themselves. The nearer the negro or mulatto approaches to the
white, the more he seems to feel his superiority over those of a darker
hue.” In postwar Savannah, Aaron Bradley mounted a political smear
campaign against his rival for a seat in Congress, Richard White, a
mixed-race Union Army veteran from Ohio. White, sneered Bradley,
was a “hybrid” who did not deserve true African American votes.
“What color will he represent himself?” asked Bradley. Answer: “The
greasy color.” Even Frederick Douglass struck sparks with Martin
Delany and John Mercer Langston, with Douglass (himself biracial)
bitterly criticizing Delany’s black racial purism for “going about the
same length in favor of blacks, as the whites have done in favor of
the doctrine of white superiority.” Delany was right to assert African
Americans’ “need for dignity and self-respect,” but not to point where
“he stands up so straight that he leans back a little.”37
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These interracial feuds lay at the base of the most singular absence
in black Reconstruction in the South, and that was the nonemergence
of a single commanding leader in the style of Martin Luther King
Jr. who could bind together the disparate shards of African American identity into a single movement. Since only Louisiana and South
Carolina had developed prewar black populations who were property owners, business proprietors, and skilled craftsmen, the likeliest
quarter from which such leadership could have developed was the
Northern black community. But few black people in the North made
the attempt. And no wonder. It was doubtful whether Southern blacks
would feel obliged to follow Northern leadership, and in 1879, the
National Conference of Colored Men actually witnessed an attack on
“Fred. Douglass and his accomplices” as “well-to-do Northern men
who will not travel out of their way to benefit the suffering Southern
Negro, and who care not for the interests of their race.” Moreover,
Southern whites would certainly make aggressive Northern blacks a
target of choice. “Write as you please, but never go south, or killed you
most assuredly will be,” warned Julia Griffiths Crofts, Douglass’s British
friend and supporter. “You are, in many respects, a marked man.” Only
Martin Delany played a significant role in Reconstruction politics in
the South, although it was usually more divisive than helpful and
ended when he accepted a judicial appointment from Democrats.
“What benefit,” he asked in 1874, “have the colored people in South
Carolina derived from the propagation of Republican sentiments?”
None, in his estimate. “Such a party is not worth the effort to keep it
in existence.”38
But the final expiration of Reconstruction was an act of homicide,
not a natural—albeit premature—death. Instead, the same Romantic feudalism that had created the old Southern order reasserted its
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hegemony, and in another decade, the promoters of a “New South”
would link hands with Northern Democrats in a comprehensive critique of the free-labor ideology. The bourgeoisie in this bourgeois
revolution scenario did not flee to the aristocrats to create a “counterrevolution of property”; quite the opposite occurred. The postwar
Southern aristocrats ensured the destruction of the pure bourgeois
revolution by appealing to a set of cultural and racial biases that safely
defused the importance of property and sharply restricted access to
it.
Understanding Reconstruction as a pure bourgeois revolution that
was strangled in its cradle by vengeful cotton nabobs offers a fourth
understanding of Reconstruction. On the one hand, it rebukes those
Eurocentric Marxists who seem unwilling or unable to see capitalism
or the bourgeoisie as anything but a poor transition to a collectivist
future; indeed, a “bourgeois revolution” ought to excite an element
of sympathy for those who so energetically fought with the beasts at
Ephesus during Reconstruction’s dying years. It should also point
us toward a more comprehensive notion of what constitutes Reconstruction, since consideration of the activities of the South’s Northern
Democratic allies has been almost nonexistent. Yet the opposition of
the Northern Democracy was as crucial an element in the failure of
Reconstruction as the Ku Klux Klan or the Redeemers. “It has always
been a sad and sore fact for an honest lover of his country to contemplate,” sighed John Pendleton Kennedy, that “the South played off
that great party of the North, to make it subservient to the selfish and
sectional purpose of putting the whole Union at the foot” of “the lordly
ambition of the aristocratic South. . . . Nothing is stranger than that
long association of the aristocratic with the democratic element of the
country . . . pigging it together in the same truckle-bed.”39 Nothing
stranger, perhaps; but that alliance survived the Civil War, and the
reassertion of a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives
in 1875 was as much the curtain-downer for Reconstruction as the
inauguration of Hayes a year and a half later.
Reconstruction’s failure also serves as a warning to overexuberant neoliberals not to embrace historical inevitability for themselves,
either. After the destruction of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama
seized on the ignominious collapse of the Soviet system as proof
that “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” was “the
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universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of
human government.” That conclusion was, to say the least, premature,
and not only because it reckoned without the rise of Islamist theocracy
or the fallout from the 2008 worldwide recession, which provoked a
renascence of Marxist advocacy in the writings of Antonio Negri and
Michael Hardt, Alain Badiou, the Occupy Movement, and Thomas
Picketty. As Badiou remarked, “[T]he senescent collapse of the USSR”
only “provisionally suspended fear” on the part of the bourgeoisie.
“Monetarist free exchange and its mediocre political appendage,
capitalist-parliamentarianism . . . is ever more poorly dissimulated
behind the fine word ‘democracy.’”40 This pattern is itself an echo of
what happened in Reconstruction, where Southerners stood the free
labor ideology on its head, turning it from being an engine of social
mobility into a legal chimera for the enforcement of serflike “contracts”
with laborers, and it stands as a warning to those who yet believe that
liberal democracy is the most desirable political future to be as wary
of Whiggish assumptions about liberal democracy’s inevitability as
the Marxists were about the dialectic. Human society has oscillated
between desires for stability, security, and reciprocity—which is what
feudalism, Marxism, and theocracy promise—and desires for mobility,
liberty, and profit, which is what the Enlightenment offered to satisfy
on a world-historical scale. Hence there is nothing that can be declared
permanent in a “bourgeois revolution,” and our own Reconstruction,
not to mention a good deal of recent history, is the unhappy proof.
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